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REVIEW ESSAYS
SURROGACY AS RESISTANCE? THE MISPLACED
FOCUS ON CHOICE IN THE SURROGACY AND
ABORTION FUNDING CONTEXTS
Birth Power: The Case for Surrogacy. By Carmel Shalev. New
Haven: Yale University Press. 1989. Pp. 224. $25.00 (cloth).
Pp. 201. $12.00 (paper).
Reviewed, by Nancy Ehrenreich*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, feminist legal theorists have been divided on the
question of how the law should deal with so-called "surrogacy" contracts, with some endorsing enforcement according to the same rules
applied to any other type of contract and others favoring regulation
or prohibition of these particular types of agreements. The split in
feminist opinion on this issue echoes a broader split in liberal feminist theory, between advocates of sex-blind laws and proponents of
sex-specific treatment in certain situations.' In the contract
parenthood context, 2 as in many others, the debate over equal versus
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law. B.A. 1974, Yale University; J.D. 1979, L.L.M. 1982, University of Virginia.
Earlier drafts of this essay benefitted from the reactions of several colleagues: David Barnes,
Penelope Bryan, Frederick Gedicks, Sheila Hyatt, Gary Peller, Steve Pepper, and Joyce Sterling.
Joan Bechtold provided helpful research assistance, as well as valuable comments, and Charles
Piot gave both moral and intellectual support.
1.See Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and
the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1118, 1142-63 (1986) (describing and critiquing that
split in the context of the debate over pregnancy disability leave). The pros and cons of each of
these approaches have been much rehearsed in the literature, and some analysts have concluded
that the debate between them is not only irresolvable but unproductive as well. Id.; see also Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEx. L. REv. 387, 398-99
(1984).
2. 1 prefer to use the term contract parenthood, rather than surrogate motherhood, to refer to
any contractual arrangement by which a woman agrees to gestate and bear a child, conceived
either with her egg or with another woman's egg, and then to give that child to its biological
father.
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special treatment (also called formal and substantive equality, or
the "sameness" and "difference" approaches) continues to be
framed by the central problem identified by liberal theory-the
question of autonomy, or choice.'
A recent book about contract parenthood, Carmel Shalev's Birth
Power. The Case for Surrogacy," is one of the latest examples of the
persistence of choice-based frameworks in feminist analyses. While
offering an original and sophisticated rendition of the equal treatment position, the book never escapes the unsatisfying terms of the
liberal debate.
The purpose of this essay is not only to assess the specific position
Shalev presents in her book, but also to illustrate the negative repercussions that the liberal framework she uses can have for women in
other contexts. To do so, I will compare Shalev's approach to that
used by the Supreme Court in its recent abortion "gag" rules decision, Rust v. Sullivan, which upheld federal regulations barring
physicians at public clinics from providing their patients with abortion counseling or referrals. 5 I will argue that the foundational assumptions of Shalev's book-a belief in the public/private dichotomy and in the primacy of choice as the determinant of when
government should refuse to intervene in the "private" sphere-are
the same assumptions that supported the Court's conclusion in Rust
that low-income women's reproductive choices are not unduly burdened by the Title X regulations.
It is important to note, however, that my point in drawing this
comparison is not to suggest that the ideological frameworks employed by these respective writers themselves produced the writers'
positions on the particular issues they address. Rather, I wish to
argue that those frameworks are problematic precisely because they
seem to account for results when in fact they do not. Employing a
dangerous and apologetic vision of the relationship between law and
society, choice-based theories hide and legitimate oppressive exercises of social power. By creating the impression that legal issues
can be resolved without making difficult decisions about the structure of social life, they divert attention from the substantive discus3. See infra note 10 and accompanying text.
4. CARMEL SHALEV, BIRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY (1989).

5. Rust v. Sullivan, I II S. Ct. 1759 (1991). Congress recently passed a bill that would have
overturned this decision, H.R. 2707, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), but was unable to override a
subsequent veto by President Bush. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
TRANSMITTING His VETO OF H.R. 2707, H.R. Doc. No. 166. 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).

19921

SURROGACY AND ABORTION FUNDING

1371

sions that should generate social policy, and legitimate the arid and
abstract discourse with which contemporary legal doctrine deals
with many social issues. They thereby obscure the unspoken (and
perhaps unconscious) factual assumptions and value choices that
generate judicial outcomes. Once one succeeds in piercing the veil of
choice ideology, it becomes far easier to identify the other factors
contributing to legal decisions. Therefore, in addition to critiquing
the analytics of Shalev's book and the Rust opinion, I will also draw
attention to the subtle assumptions about women, especially low-income women and women of color, that are obscured by the discourse of choice that frames both works.
In Part 11, I briefly outline the two formal and substantive equality positions and identify their strengths and weaknesses. In Part
II, I use Shalev's book to illustrate how those approaches are in
irresolvable conflict. In short, I argue that, while her defense of surrogacy can be criticized as unresponsive to important substantive
equality concerns, she nevertheless raises problems with the invalidation of parenthood contracts that cannot be easily dismissed. The
flaw in her analysis is not, therefore, in her preference for one set of
concerns over another but rather in her initial conceptualization of
the problem. By accepting the traditional liberal dichotomy between
a "free" private world and a regulatable public one, she consigns
herself to an analysis that is driven by the question of whether individuals' choices are freely made. I propose an alternative approach,
one that recognizes that such questions merely obscure exercises of
power, and calls instead for an explicit consideration of the structuring of, and distribution of resources within, the reproductive realm.
In Part IV, I illustrate how formal equality reasoning of the type
employed by Shalev in her analysis of contract parenthood was used
to justify disastrous results for women in Rust v. Sullivan. I argue
that Rust is not only another illustration of how the concept of
"choice" is indeterminate, but also that it demonstrates, as does
Shalev's analysis, the extent to which the entire notion of choice is
incoherent. In short, both Shalev and the Rust Court employ a
framework that ignores the extent to which private choices are
themselves constructed and constrained by governmental power.
Rust illustrates how continuing to frame our arguments around the
question of choice leaves us open to uses of those same frameworks
in ways that clearly harm women.
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THE LIBERAL FRAMEWORK

The split among liberal legal feminists between the formal equality or "equal treatment" position, and the substantive equality or
"special treatment" position, is so widely known that it requires only
brief review. Formal equality theorists argue that the legal system
should treat the sexes absolutely identically, and that any distinction
drawn on the basis of gender is therefore highly suspect.6 Substantive equality theorists, on the other hand, are willing to shape the
law to accommodate women's specific and current needs, even if
that accommodation constitutes a deviation from a rigorous sexblind approach. 7
The perceived pros and cons of these two approaches are similar
in the various contexts in which they arise.' The formal equality
branch is said to be best at eradicating negative stereotypes of
women. Because its foundational principle is that there are no
meaningful differences between the sexes, judicial opinions and
other analyses using it are thought to undermine the association of
women with a constellation of devalued traits-weakness, passivity,
emotionality, etc., for white, privileged women and (though less
often noted) strength, aggressiveness, promiscuity, etc., for women
of color and perhaps poor women as well. In contrast, the substantive equality branch, because it advocates differential treatment of
women, can (according to this argument) have the unfortunate side
effect of reinforcing existing assumptions that females are inherently
different from males and that they cannot protect their own
interests.
On the other hand, the formal equality approach is thought to
perpetuate existing inequities, while substantive equality specifically
redresses them. Unlike sex-blind theories, the substantive equality
approach recognizes that existing inequalities are merely perpetuated by identical treatment-that, to paraphrase Anatole France's
famous statement, 9 forbidding both the poor and the rich to sleep
under bridges disproportionately affects the poor and thus perpetu6. See, e.g., Wendy Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special
Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325 (1985).

7. See, e.g.,

ELIZABETH WOLGAST. EQUALITY AND THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN

(1980).

8. See generally Finley, supra note I (workplace context); Olsen, supra note I (statutory rape
context).
9. France is reported to have said: "The law, in its majestic equality, forbids rich and poor alike
to sleep under bridges, beg in the streets or steal bread." THE CONCISE COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF
QUOTATIONS 149 (Robert Andrews ed., 1989).
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ates their subordination. Special treatment policies thus are said to
offer the advantage of protecting women from the material and social inequalities of the present, while equal treatment policies offer
the advantage of eliminating negative stereotypes so that (so the
theory goes) women will be treated better in the future.
In general, both branches of liberal legal feminism tend to emphasize the need to protect women's autonomy, and both evoke
traditional images of the proper relationship of the state to society.10
The notion of individual autonomy, or choice, is of course the primary construct that liberal legal theory uses to define when government is justified in interfering with-individual freedom. A consistent
theme of liberal ideology is the notion that governmental intervention in the private sphere is justified only when necessary to protect
individuals from being overpowered by other private actors. People
can be punished for rapes only when their acts of sexual intercourse
are nonconsensual, employers are responsible for sexual harassment
only if it is "unwelcome,"" injuries for which people assume the
risks are not compensable unless the risk was involuntarily assumed,
etc. Freely chosen behaviors are part of the "private" sphere and
cannot be interfered with by government; coerced decisions exceed
private rights and therefore can, and should, be regulated in the
public sphere. 2 Thus, when liberal feminists argue over whether
government should intervene in the private sphere to regulate contract parenthood activities, they implicitly accept the notion that
there is such a sphere and that government should regulate it only
when necessary to protect individuals from the coercive power of
others.
Such a brief review of the two positions already suggests the irresolvability of the tension between them. The liberal debate is, ultimately, extremely unsatisfying, precisely because both sides raise
important and legitimate concerns yet both also pose serious and
seemingly intractable problems. That is why some theorists have ar10. The substantive equality position actually encompasses a fairly wide variety of stances.
Moreover, many people do not fit neatly into either the equal treatment or the special treatment
category. See Finley, supra note 1, at 1143-44 n.l 11. Thus, not all authors who might be considered special treatment advocates employ the assumptions that I describe here.
11.Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986). See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43
STAN. L. REV. 813, 826-34 (1991), for a critique of the unwelcomeness requirement showing that
it retains a consent-like character.
12. See Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982) (describing and critiquing the public/private distinction); Gary Peller,
The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151 (1985) (same).
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gued that we need to escape the dichotomy between choice and coercion and recharacterize the issues at stake in the pursuit of
women's equality.'3 Only by conceiving of equality as something
other than freedom from governmental bias and constraint can we
press beyond the sameness/difference debate.
III.
A.

CONTRACT PARENTHOOD AND CHOICE

14

Shalev's Argument for a "Social" Definition of Parenthood

1. Avoiding Harmful Stereotypes
Shalev's defense of contract parenthood illustrates the cat-chasing-its-tail quality of the liberal debate. According to Shalev, invalidating surrogacy agreements "denies the notion of female reproductive agency and reinforces the traditional perception of women as
imprisoned in the subjectivity of their wombs."' 5 To treat these contracts as coerced, she argues, merely reinforces negative stereotypes
of women and thus ultimately undermines their autonomy. While
this is a classic equal treatment position, Shalev articulates it in a
particularly original way. Rather than merely trotting out the familiar old negative adjectives-passive, weak, indecisive-she presents
a much more subtle and provocative picture of the ideological
messages that she claims are undermined by enforcing parenthood
contracts.
For Shalev, the acceptance of contract parenthood would move
society to the last stage of a progression from a "biological" definition of parenthood, based on blood connection, to a "social" definition, based on individual intent. The latter definition is preferable,
she argues, for it would free women from the "double standard of
sexual-reproductive conduct"' 16 that has been the bedrock of gender
inequality. That double standard-under which women's sexual behavior is more constrained than men's in order to assure the paternity of their offspring, 1 7 and women rather than men are assigned
the rearing of children because they are thought to be instinctively
13. See, e.g., Olsen, supra note 1, at 430.
14. Many of the ideas presented in this Part were first developed in Nancy S. Ehrenreich,
Wombs for Hire, TIKKUN May/June 1991, at 71.
15. SHALEV. supra note 4, at 121; see also, Marjorie M. Schultz, Reproductive Technology and
Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 297, 354-55

(making similar argument),
16. SHALEV, supra note 4, at 12.
17. Id. at 15.
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suited to the task' 8-is no longer necessary once kinship is defined
as unrelated to genetic connection. Such a redefinition not only
eliminates the need to control women's sexual activity in order to
ascertain paternity but also undermines the reduction of women to
their biology-the perception of them as overemotional while pregnant 19 and instinctively maternal afterwards-by reducing the importance of the physical connection between parent and child.
Moreover, a legal definition of kinship, in which parental relations
are produced by entry into binding contracts, would further undermine harmful stereotypes of women by treating them as independent and responsible moral agents.20
Shalev develops her argument through successive chapters on
adoption, artificial insemination, contract parenthood, and in vitro
fertilization. She claims that the doctrinal frameworks used to regulate each of these areas illustrate contrasting uses of either biological or social definitions of kinship, and that the trend in law is towards adopting the latter.2 Thus, in the adoption context, she says,
the traditional severing of any tie to the biological family upon
adoption reflects the importance of biology in defining parent/child
relationships. Since biological definitions can envision only one set of
parents, in adoption the biological approach necessarily requires the
original parents to be completely eliminated before the new ones can
be installed. 22 Shalev thus celebrates the move towards open adoption as a move towards legal definitions of kinship.
In contrast to adoption, Shalev argues, artificial insemination is
and has been approached by the law under a contract model, "giving binding effect to the primary intentions of the involved parties." ' 23 Thus, a sperm donor, for example, has no parental obligations to the offspring produced with his sperm while the husband of
the woman who is inseminated is usually treated as the legal father.24 In the in vitro insemination context, Shalev asserts, the absence of a contractual approach has resulted in significant harm to
18.

Id. at 35.
19. Id. at 121.
20. Id. at 11."Itseems to me that the refusal to acknowledge the legal validity of surrogacy
agreements implies that women are not competent, by virtue of their biological sex, to act as
rational, moral agents regarding their reproductive activity." Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 76-77.
23. Id. at 58.
24. Id. at 77-81.
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women. 2 5 The many abuses that physicians have committed in the
course of developing that technology, such as misinforming women
of the risks and discomfort associated with the procedure and generally failing to afford them the protections usually given research
subjects, stem from dehumanizing attitudes towards women as mere
containers-attitudes that could be eliminated, Shalev believes, by
use of an intent-based, contractual approach.26 Thus, in each context she considers, Shalev concludes that an intent-based definition
of kinship would produce salutary results for women. The conclusion
she draws from this review is that surrogacy contracts should be
enforced, for such enforcement would reinforce the trend towards
the use of intent-based definitions.
While Shalev's version of the formal equality argument is one of
the most creative and provocative that I have encountered, it is not
without its shortcomings. I will focus here solely on her analysis of
contract parenthood. The principal problem with Shalev's contention that parenthood agreements should be.enforced is her failure to
recognize that numerous aspects of such agreements actually resonate with, rather than challenge, patriarchal patterns of thought.
For example, enforcing such agreements does not necessarily create
an image of women as rational, responsible decision makers rather
than instinctive mothers. Given the discourse surrounding this issue,
which treats infertility as a human tragedy of immense proportions
and child rearing as an inviolable right, enforcing such contracts
would seem to suggest that it is absolutely essential for women to
become mothers, by whatever means possible. In fact, to the extent
that contract parenthood arrangements suggest that women feel an
urge to mother even those children whom they do not biologically
produce, those arrangements arguably expand the notion that
women are instinctive mothers rather than eliminate it.
More importantly, the messages that contract parenthood conveys
do not eliminate the biological aspect of the paternal kin connection
either. As Barbara Katz Rothman has pointed out, the intent-based
definition of parenthood that results from contractual approaches to
this issue produces a scheme in which it is the woman's relationship
to the biological father of the child that determines whether she is
the mother. 7 Thus, if the ovum donor is a stranger to the father and
25. Id. at 105.
26. Id. at 105-12.
27. BARBARA KATZ

ROTHMAN, RECREATING

MOTHERHOOD

232-36 (1989).
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the gestator is his wife, in whom the embryo has been implanted,
then the gestator is the mother. But if the ovum donor is the wife
and the gestator a stranger, as in a recent California case involving
a white father and an African-American birth mother, 28 then the
ovum donor is the mother. In surrogacy, the biological definition of
motherhood is rejected, but the biological definition of fatherhood is
left very much intact.
In addition, Shalev's notion that women are devalued and disadvantaged as a result of being thought to be instinctive mothers ignores the disparity between images of white, privileged women, on
the one hand, and low-income women and women of color, on the
other.29 She therefore overestimates, perhaps, the positive effect of
eliminating that stereotype. While Shalev recognizes that not all
women are instinctive mothers in the eyes of the law, her discussion
of differential legal treatment is limited to the impact of law on unmarried women. She persuasively contends, for example, that in
adoption law unmarried birth mothers are treated as not having any
maternal instinct at all. Thus, they are criticized if they consider
keeping their children, for it is assumed that the children will be
better off elsewhere.3" Shalev argues that unmarried women who
seek artificial insemination are similarly seen as selfish, rather than
as understandably desiring to become mothers. 3 '
This subtle cultural analysis would have been enriched by attention to the ways in which low-income women and women of color
are similarly devalued as mothers and contrasted negatively with
white, privileged women. 32 Perhaps such a broader exploration of
28. In that case, the trial court held that the wife of the father, an Asian-American woman who
had neither a genetic nor a gestational connection to the fetus, was nevertheless its mother. Anna
J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), review granted and opinion superseded
by 822 P.2d 1317 (Cal. 1992); see also Janice Raymond, International Traffic in Reproduction,
Ms. MAG.. May/June 1991, at 31. The case, which in effect pitted two women of color against
each other, illustrates, perhaps, the preeminent importance of class factors in the contract
parenthood context.
29. See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
30. SHALEV, supra note 4, at 41.
31. Id. at 67.
32. The societal tendency to characterize women as either pure and virtuous or evil and dangerous, as either madonna or whore, is widely recognized. What receives less attention, however, is
the way in which who gets put into which category is affected by race and class. For some recent
pieces that do explore these connections, see Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who
Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419,
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the different images of various groups of women in society would
have led Shalev to recognize that, for devalued women, subordination comes not from being seen as motherly, but rather from the
opposite. 3 Such a focus might have, in turn, allowed Shalev to notice that the discourse surrounding contract parenthood, like that
surrounding adoption and artificial insemination, contains both a
"bad girl" and a "good girl." In the surrogacy context, the class
differences between the "surrogate"-even the term implies the illegitimacy of her claims-and the woman obtaining her services serve
to undermine the former's position and create sympathy for the latter.34 Thus, for example, Judge Sorkow, the trial judge in In re
Baby M, characterized Dr. Stern's unwillingness to risk her health
to bear a child as "understandable," but criticized Mary Beth
Whitehead for calling her husband's alcohol abuse "his problem." 3
Whitehead was supposed to act as a selfless nurturer to a grown
1436-44 (1991) (women of color); Martha L. Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses,
1991 DUKE L.J. 274 (single and poor women). Since the majority of women of color are lowincome, and three-fifths of children of color are born to single mothers, Myron E. Wegman, Annual Summary of Vital Statistis-1988, 84 PEDIATRICS 943, 944-45 (1989), these categories of
disparagement overlap and interrelate. Moreover, poverty, singleness, and minority ethnic status
tend to be equated in popular perceptions, even when the facts do not support such impressions:
"[lin the public's mind, and despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the face of poverty has increasingly become that of a single mother, particularly the African-American single
mother." Fineman, supra, at 287-88 (footnote omitted). For general discussions of the intersection
of race and gender, see Crenshaw, supra note 29; Harris, supra note 29.
33. See Crenshaw, supra note 29, at 155-58.
34. The class differences exist because, at $25,000 or more per effort, only the relatively
wealthy can afford to pay others to birth babies for them, and primarily the relatively impecunious
agree to do so for pay. See Susan Buttenweiser, Reprotech and the Law, Ms. MAO., May/June
1991, at 46 (at least forty percent of all "surrogate" mothers are on welfare), Note that, under
parenthood contracts, the biological definition of motherhood is in a sense eliminated for the gestational mother, who is defined not as the mother at all. But I would suggest that this does not
mean that surrogacy undermines existing categories. Rather, it merely affirms the difference between "good" and "bad" mothers. It is because of society's longstanding unwillingness to recognize the legitimacy of single and low-income women's claims to motherhood, as evidenced not only
in the patterns Shalev identifies but also in the general pathologizing of poor families (especially
those of color), that many find it so easy to assume that a contract birth mother should be able to
give up her child without any difficulty. These women have never been seen as "true" mothers to
begin with. See Fineman, supra note 32, at 281-83 (linking the characterization of single mothers
as "bad" with the public perception that the poor are undeserving); Jewell H. Gresham, The
Politics of Family in America, NATION. July 24/31, 1989, at 116, 117-19 (criticizing the Moynihan Report and the CBS Special Report, The Vanishing Black Family-Crisis in Black America,
for their negative treatment of the black family).
35. In re Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128, 1139-41 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987); see also Katha
Pollitt, The Strange Case of Baby M, NATION. May 23, 1987, at 667, 682 (noting that much was
said about the Whiteheads' marital troubles and financial woes but the Sterns' personal lives underwent little scrutiny).
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man, but Stern did not need to sacrifice her own well-being even for
a child.
Thus, while Shalev raises some important questions about
whether women will be seen as independent, rational decision makers if their parenthood contracts are not enforced, the universalizing
focus of her analysis leaves her assertions open to debate. Nevertheless, her argument about validating women's agency and competence is ultimately more original and convincing than her argument
about preserving their "freedom" to enter into such contracts, addressed below.
2.. Protecting Women's Autonomy
This section will draw on the insights of substantive equality proponents to critique Shalev's position. I will argue that Shalev's contention that enforcing parenthood contracts would also preserve
women's free choice fails to consider adequately both the material
and the attitudinal context in which the decision to bear a child for
money is made.
While she acknowledges that the economic exploitation of "surrogates" is a possibility that should be taken into account,36 Shalev
never takes this concern seriously. 7 Rather, she argues that contractual conception (as contrasted with the pregnancies that result in
adoptions) is "deliberate, ' 38 and she proceeds from the premise that
"in modern society . . . a person may generally acquire social, economic, or political position as an independent agent by means of
free agreement or contract with others."' 3
Yet the inadequacy of the child-care system in this country, combined with the fact that women earn only two-thirds of what men
earn for comparable work,40 means that women in marriages are
almost inevitably the ones to care for the children. Such confinement to the home severely limits their ability to bring in extra in36. SHALEV. supra note 4, at 151.
37. In fact, Shalev suggests that those concerned with such exploitation are themselves creating
a madonna and whore dichotomy, with the "surrogate" mother as the madonna and the wife of
the biological father, an accomplice in his act of exploitation, the whore. Id.
38. Id. at 96.
39. Id. at 18. To be fair to Shalev, I should mention that this quote was part of a larger
discussion of Sir Henry Maine's theory that relations in society have progressed from "status" to
"contract." While she seems herself to be endorsing the notion that in modern society status is
achieved rather than ascribed, it is possible that she intended this sentence only to be describing
Maine's thought.
40. See infra note 126 and accompanying text (comparing full-time male and female earnings).
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come and therefore makes parenthood contracts quite appealing-not inherently, but rather as one of the few jobs that do not
require leaving home. For single women, the attractions of surrogacy are even greater: Who, in the strained economic situation so
typical of single mothers, would deny the appeal of holding two jobs
at once?
Noting that "there is concern that a free market scheme would
relegate underprivileged women to a new oppressed and undignified
occupation, like prostitutes and wet nurses," Shalev nevertheless dismissively concludes that "it should be obvious that the idea of a free
market in reproduction does not attempt as such to rectify existing
social inequities."" 1 What she fails to realize is that her proposal not
only does not rectify gender and class inequality, but actually exacerbates it. By endorsing the incorporation of a formerly noncontractual area of human endeavor, reproduction, 42 into the world of market transactions, she expands the realm in which women's low
economic status could negatively affect their choices.43
Shalev not only fails to appreciate the importance of economic
constraints on women's choices, but also gives insufficient attention
to the ideological forces that probably affect surrogacy decisions.
While she does recognize that ideological forces affect the behavior
of infertile couples, noting that the "cultural pressure on women to
realize themselves as mothers might well be a factor in the singleminded compulsion with which many childless couples pursue all
available means to establish a family," 44 she does not extend this
appreciation for the effect of ideology to the potential surrogates
themselves. Women such as Mary Beth Whitehead, who signed her
contract with William Stern in order to give the "most loving gift of
happiness to an unfortunate couple," 45 are just as likely to be affected by traditional gender roles as are infertile women. The equation of (valued) femaleness with selflessness and motherhood would
seem to provide just the motivation necessary to cause a woman to
41. SHALEV, supra note 4, at 159; cf. Schultz, supra note 15, at 352-55 (concluding likewise
that such decisions should be left to the individual, but after a much more thoughtful analysis).
42. I say that reproduction was previously noncontractual because contracts for the sale or
adoption of children are generally held invalid, and contract parenthood simply has not been practiced to any significant extent until recent years.
43. Admittedly, she also increases the realm of choice for privileged women, for whom market
transactions are likely to be advantageous.
44. SHALEV, supra note 4, at 151.
45. In re Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128, 1142 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987).
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enter into a contract that pays the equivalent of $1.57 per hour for
nine months4" of life- and health-endangering, emotionally difficult
work.47

Because of her failure to recognize the impact of traditional ideology on potential surrogates, and her conviction that the impact of
limited economic resources is not a relevant constraint on women's
choices in this context, Shalev never even considers whether
parenthood contracts should be removed from the free market system altogether. Yet, given that we already set limits to the legitimate operation of the market-one cannot sell oneself into slavery
or buy another's kidney, for example-her argument is .incomplete
without reaching that question.
In contrast, those examinations of contract parenthood that discuss when interactions should be protected from the distortions of
market exchange are more subtle and thoughtful. Margaret Radin
has suggested, for example, that both the closeness of contract
parenthood to baby selling and the harmful effects of commodifying
women's reproductive capacity justify making that capacity inalienable by allowing only unpaid surrogacy arrangements. 8 Similarly,
Martha Field has proposed that paid parenthood contracts be allowed, but not be enforced against the gestational mother.49 But
Shalev, in cleaving to her strictly individualistic approach, fails even
to consider the possibility that reproductive capacity, like children
and bodily organs, might just be something people should not be
allowed to sell. While her decontextualized vision of how people
choose to become surrogates is consistent with her conviction that a
formal equality stance will validate the responsibility and rationality
of women, it provides an impoverished understanding of the motivational dynamics that underlie the decision to enter into a parenthood
contract.
46. This figure does not, of course, include the number of hours spent on unsuccessful
insemination.
47. See Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and
Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner. 99 HARV. L. REV. 384, 390 (1985) (arguing that an individual's act of consent does not necessarily further her own autonomy and wellbeing or the interests of the community at large).
48. Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100
49.

HARV.

L.

REV.

MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 10-11 (1990).

1849, 1932 (1987).,
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The Inadequacy of the Liberal Framework

1. Irresolvable Dilemmas
The formal and substantive equality positions on contract
parenthood fit together like hand and glove. The strengths of each
are seen as the weaknesses of the other. Thus, just as I deployed
substantive equality concerns above to raise questions about Shalev's
conclusions, so it is also possible to use Shalev's concerns themselves
to criticize the substantive equality critique. The resulting circularity of argument is one reason why the liberal framework is ultimately not a very satisfying approach.
Despite the reasons raised from a special treatment perspective
for why a woman's decision to enter into a surrogacy contract
should not be seen as much of a choice, it is very paternalistic to
treat a surrogate's act of signing a parenthood contract as not indicative of her "true" intentions. To fail to enforce such agreements
clearly conveys the message that the women who sign them are unaware of or unable to determine their own best interests, and thereby
reinforces the notion that women are better at sacrificing themselves
to others than at making rational judgments or protecting themselves.5 0 Moreover, to the extent that the invalidation of a
parenthood contract disadvantages the couple that seeks surrogacy
services, nonenforcement also suggests that women are irresponsible
in a way that harms others.
In addition, the substantive equality position begs the question
that inevitably follows from the recognition of economic inequality
and the effect it has on market transactions. That is, even if it is
true that women's low pay and limited job opportunities create pressure on them to enter into parenthood contracts, the question of
what to do about that fact remains. To decide that such contracts
should be invalidated is to prevent the individual woman from striking her own balance between entering into an exploitative contractual arrangement and going without needed money.5 1 Shalev recog50. SHALMV. supra note 4, at 121-22.
51. One way to avoid this result, while still protecting women from decisions they regret, is to
make the contracts legal but unenforceable against the gestational mother, as Martha Field suggests. FIELD, supra note 49, at 10- IL.However, Field's approach, by only protecting gestational
mothers who refuse to perform under the contract, does not address the exploitation inherent in
the continued performance of women whose economic circumstances make them feel obliged to
follow through with the agreement. On the other hand, it does avoid the paternalism of approaches like Radin's that take the decision completely away from the woman.
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nizes this point, suggesting that the people she is most concerned to
protect are the ones who would make the unconventional choice:
"Legal norms based on assumptions about universal sex-based difference. tend to create obstacles for the individual woman who
wishes to deviate from traditionally prescribed social roles."152 For
the woman who is not constrained by economic pressures, or who
actually prefers the money even while realizing that she is being
exploited, the substantive equality position's conclusion that these
contracts are not freely entered into is, in some sense at least,
inaccurate.
Nor is Shalev completely off base when she suggests that economic inequality is irrelevant to the debate about surrogacy. 5a To
point out the coercive, choice-constraining effect of distributional
disparities is only to make half an argument for invalidating
parenthood agreements, for it is still necessary to distinguish these
types of agreements from employment decisions, agreements to lease
housing, and numerous other choices that are affected by the relative bargaining power of the people who enter into them. To suggest
that women should be protected from the unfairness of market
transactions without suggesting that others similarly disadvantaged
in such transactions should also be protected is to appear to give
unfair preferential treatment to women.54
Shalev is not unaware of these tensions in liberal theories. In fact,
she nicely articulates the Scylla and Charybdis between which the
liberal framework requires one to navigate: "How can we accommodate those differences relevant for legal purposes without perpetuating the inferior status of women as a class? The challenge is to reconcile the concepts of equality and difference without falling into
52. SHALEV. supra note 4, at 153-54.
53. Id. at 20.
54. To me, this is the strongest argument that equal-treatment feminists make. For them, it is
more important to try to get the whole loaf of bread-economic reform of the entire system, if
that is what we are really concerned about-than to settle for half-special protection for women.
For a particularly persuasive articulation of this argument, see Williams, supra note 6.
Of course, it is possible to respond to such an argument by contending, for example, that reproductive activity is simply different from other types of activity. E.g.. Radin, supra note 48, at 1932
(arguing that procreative 'activity is central to "human flourishing" and therefore deserves special
protection). However, to treat reproduction as different from other types of behavior, such as
laboring in the workplace, is to risk idealizing motherhood in such a way as to reinforce traditional and harmful stereotypes of women. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130,
141-42 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) (justifying exclusion of women from practice of law on
grounds that the "paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign
offices of wife and mother").
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the trap of paternalist protectionism.
Unfortunately, recognizing
the tensions does not lead her to ask whether they might be inevitable and irreconcilable. Rather than consider that the problem lies in
the very terms of the debate, Shalev simply returns to her position
that the formal equality concerns are more convincing.
2.

Apologetic Assumptions

Even if the irresolvability of the conflict between equal treatment
and special treatment concerns is not, in and of itself, enough reason
to reject the liberal framework, the apologetic nature of the liberal
schema raises serious questions about its usefulness. As I pointed
out earlier, some versions of both liberal positions seem to assume
that it is theoretically coherent to talk about whether women freely
agree to become "surrogates." While they differ as to what decisions
should be seen as freely chosen, they agree that those that are so
chosen are not problematic." Yet by framing the argument in terms
of this choice/coercion dichotomy, both liberal approaches legitimate a fundamentally flawed vision of the relation between law and
society. To the extent that they consider voluntary decisions to be
legitimate and not subject to governmental invalidation, and involuntary ones to justify governmental interference in otherwise private
interactions, both approaches accept the foundational liberal notion
of a distinction between private and public, and both assume that it
is descriptively accurate to say that some choices are "free" and
others "coerced."
This vision is flawed because it fails to appreciate both the indeterminacy of the concept of choice and the extent to which individual preferences are themselves socially constructed. The indeterminacy point does not require much elaboration. It is fairly
uncontroversial to point out that people differ as to which choices
they consider to be freely made and which ones they consider coerced. The debate between equal and special treatment proponents
itself illustrates the fact that different definitions of choice can be
held by different people. To some, signing a parenthood contract because you desperately need money is merely the free market at
55. SHALEV. supra note 4, at 154 (citation omitted). Shalev also talks about the "tension between treating women as a disadvantaged group of victims and as individual autonomous agents."
Id.

56. As I noted previously, however, it is difficult to generalize about all substantive equality
proponents, See supra note 10.
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work; to others, it is the epitome of coercion. Thus, judicial determinations that contracts (or sexual relations or criminal conspiracies)
were freely entered into are not determinations about "what happened," but rather they are value-based decisions about what should
be considered choice. If this is so, however, then the concept of
choice cannot, itself, serve as the boundary line between the public
and the private-the indicator of whether government should intervene to protect someone from coercion or refuse to intervene in deference to private freedom. In short, in deciding when enforcing a
certain contract or type of contract will facilitate individual freedom, and when it will undermine freedom, courts are defining rather
than effectuating individual choice." As a result, contract law inevitably chooses, and institutionalizes, a particular vision of the private
world." It defines the private rather than merely protecting it.
Not only is the definition of choice that is used to assess private
behavior a product of governmental value choices, but also private
behavior itself is affected by the state. While Shalev recognizes this
at one level, pointing out many aspects of law that affect social attitudes towards various areas of reproductive activity,5 9 she draws
from those insights only the implication that the attitudes, and
hence the law, should be changed.6" What she fails to see is that her
57. See Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law.
with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power. 41 MD. L. REV.
563, 581-83 (1982). This point might seem to some to be merely restating the by now obvious
Realist insight that law reflects policy choices. Nevertheless, I think it is not unimportant that
despite this insight the discourse of legal opinions still reinforces the old formalistic vision of the
relationship between law and the individual. Courts talk, for example, in terms of whether someone has freely chosen rather than in terms of whether it benefits society to characterize her conduct as chosen. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir, 1986)
(holding that the question of whether plaintiff "voluntarily" entered the workplace is relevant to
whether she has legitimate hostile environment sexual harassment claim), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1041 (1987); In re Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128, 1159 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987) ("Each had
what the other wanted. A price for the service each was to perform was struck and a bargain
reached. One did not force the other."); see also Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law. 99 YALE L. 1177
(1990) (critiquing concept of choice within a discussion of Rabidue and hostile environment sexual harassment law).
58. And choice is not so much a determinant of results as it is a vehicle for justifying them. See
Peller, supra note 12, at 1226-40 (discussing Realist critiques of "choice").
59. She points out, for example, that legal rules and practices surrounding both adoption and
artificial insemination have imposed very traditional roles upon women by stressing the importance of childbearing and rearing for those who are married, while denying the existence of aiiy
maternal interests on the part of those who are not. SHALEV, supra note 4, at 41-42, 67.
60. For example, one reason that she applauds the recent interest in open adoption is that it
revalues single mothers. Id.
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concern for protecting the right of individual women to choose surrogacy assumes that their choices are somehow arrived at separate
and apart from the culture in which they exist. Yet the ideological
messages conveyed by years of state regulation of reproductive activity,"' and the economic constraints imposed by pervasive state
regulation of economic relations and property ownership,62 mean
that the government, and law, are inevitably implicated in such decisions. By structuring the society in which choices are made, the
state fundamentally affects those choices. 3
If this is true, then the crucial questions that demand our attention are not whether the state should intervene in particular "private" decisions-it is clearly implicated in all individual decisions 6 -but rather what should be the conditions under which those
decisions are made. 5 If law does not facilitate private choices, but
rather defines and constructs them, then we should not be talking
about how to preserve private freedom. Instead we should be talking
about how to structure humane and fulfilling contractual and reproductive relations in our society.
Therefore, to me, the most compelling treatments of the contract
parenthood issue are those that take the broader perspective, asking
what societal conditions account for the shortcomings of the various

solutions that have been proposed and how those conditions can be
changed.6 6 For instance, we must first ask why infertility is thought
61. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
62. From a legally enforced regime of private property that makes most people's survival depend on wage labor, to a publicly structured wage system that fails to give equal pay to women for
work of comparable worth to that performed by men, to a definition of wage labor (that is, work
for which people are entitled to be paid) that excludes domestic work in one's home, the law
establishes a background that severely constrains women's economic power and choices.
63. This critique of the public/private dichotomy is somewhat in tension with the commodification argument I mentioned previously. Supra note 48 and accompanying text. That is, the market
arguably constructs and constrains nonmarket relations, just as law and government construct
individual decisions. The same critique can be used against both of these two versions of the
public/private dichotomy. See generally Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1497 (1983); Peller, supra note 12, at 1222, 1233-36.
64. In other words, the notion of a separate "private" sphere of individual interaction unaffected by governmental power is incoherent.
65. Of course, I do not mean to say that individual preferences about reproductive behavior
would necessarily be irrelevant to such a restructuring. The point is that it is precisely in how we
structure the conditions under which reproductive activity takes place that we really increase
human freedom and fulfillment.
66. See. e.g., GENA COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE 213-49 (1985); FIELD. supra note 49;
Rhonda Copelon et al., Looking Toward the Future: Feminism and Reproductive Technologies,
37 BUFF. L. REV. 203 (1988-89); Radin, supra note 48; Schultz, supra note 15.
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to be such a problem. 67 Once we realize that it is probably the elevation of biological kinship over nonblood relations-along with, no
doubt, the resistance to adoption of "imperfect" babies, such as minority and special-needs children 6 -that accounts for the notion
that infertility is a national tragedy, 6 9 the irony in Shalev's position
becomes clear. For, while Shalev argues that allowing women to
enter into parenthood contracts will improve their status by eliminating biological definitions of kinship, she fails to recognize that it
is the biological definitions of kinship themselves that produce the
demand for "surrogates" in the first place. Since enforcing
parenthood contracts reinforces this concern with perpetuating the
male line, it might be a very shortsighted way to address the problem of infertility.
Instead, infertility might be more profitably addressed by attacking the underlying causes of the phenomenon, both attitudinal (preference for blood-based paternity, resistance to adoption of existing
children) and external (sexually transmitted diseases, workplace
hazards such as chemicals and radiation,7 0 unconsented sterilization
of low-income women 7 1). Such a focus on the causes, rather than
the effects, of the infertility phenomenon would not only benefit all
people who cannot reproduce biologically (as opposed to only those
who can afford to pay $25,000 or more for procreative services), but
would also help to undermine several troublesome dichotomies (natural/adopted, normal/special needs, fertile/infertile) that establish
harmful hierarchies between individuals. Moreover, these efforts
would produce a fertile society without treating women as breeders
whose bodies can and should be used for the benefit of either other
individuals or society at large.
67. See Copelon etal., supra note 66, at 221, 229.
68. Id. at 229.
69. For example, William Stern, the biological father in the Baby M case, preferred contract
parenthood over adoption because he wanted to perpetuate his genetic line. In re Baby M, 525
A.2d 1128, 1139 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987). Of course, the fact that Stern's parents were
the only members of his family to survive the Holocaust, leaving him as the sole person capable of
continuing his line, makes his desire particularly understandable to many. Nevertheless, such special cases aside, it seems highly likely that the impulse to use surrogacy rather than adoption will
usually reflect simply a more straightforward interest in biological connection.
70. Copelon et al., supra note 66, at 205.
71. See generally Adele Clarke, Subtle Forms of Sterilization Abuse: A Reproductive Rights
Analysis, in TEST-TUBE WOMEN 188 (Rita Arditti etal. eds., 1984) (discussing sterilization abuse
and other practices that affect women's reproductive lives).

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

1388

IV.

[Vol. 41:1369

LIBERAL ARGUMENTS IN THE ABORTION CONTEXT

A.

Introduction

In Part IIl, I argued that Shalev's focus on whether parenthood
contracts are chosen or coerced suffers from two flaws. First, it obscures (and therefore reinforces) patriarchal ideology-including
the madonna/whore dichotomy, with the "surrogate'; mother defined as the "bad girl." Second, it takes the position that parenthood
contracts are uncoerced, thereby legitimating the notion that it is
meaningful to think of behavior as "really" free willed or not, separate and apart from how we choose to view it. As such, her approach obscures the fact that it is the desirability of the conditions
under which reproductive activities are carried out, the substantive
vision of how to construct a humane society, that is at issue in surrogacy cases-not whether the particular woman's choice was
voluntary.
The majority opinion in Rust v. Sullivan7 1 illustrates the
problems that these analytical flaws can produce in other contexts.
As I explain in Part IV(D) below, that opinion, like Shalev's book,
subtly relies upon (and reproduces) the good girl/bad girl distinction, identifying women who seek abortions as bad. Moreover, as I
discuss in Part IV(E), it asks the same wrong question that Shalev
asks, focusing on whether governmental failure to fund abortion
counseling and referrals constrains individual choice rather than on
whether the conditions under which women live their reproductive
lives are acceptable. To begin with, I will illustrate the indeterminacy of the Rust majority's choice/coercion analysis by presenting
an argument to the effect that the Title X "gag" rules 73 actually do
burden women's reproductive choices. My point here will not be,
however, to suggest that the Court's mistake was in failing to conclude that the rules are in fact coercive. Rather, its mistake was in
failing to recognize that, given the irresolvability of the debate
about whether they are, the choice/coercion question is the wrong
one to be asking.
B.

The Interference/Noninterference Distinction

Before directly addressing the Rust arguments, it is first neces72. III S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
73. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 to 300a-8 (1988).
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sary to explore the choice/coercion dichotomy as it plays out in the
abortion context. There, as in contract parenthood, the public/private dichotomy plays a central role in the discourse. But, unlike in
surrogacy, in abortion the only type of coercion that is considered
illegitimate is governmental coercion. That is, courts considering
parenthood contracts have doctrinal mechanisms for prohibiting
such agreements in order to protect women from "private" coercive
factors; they can, for instance, declare them void as against public
74
policy, as the New Jersey Supreme Court did in In re Baby M.
However, since the abortion right (and the due process analysis
upon which it is grounded) has been articulated as a right to freedom only from governmental interference in reproductive decisions,7 a court's conclusion that a woman's choice is constrained
only by private, not public, power effectively precludes her constitutional claim.7 Thus, since the question of whether the government
has interfered with women's reproductive rights can also be phrased
as the question of whether women have been coerced by the government, the noninterference/interference line I discuss here could also

be called a (private) choice/(public) coercion line.7 7
It has been argued that, once the problem is conceptualized as
one of how to protect private freedom from governmental coercion,
the outcome in such a case is a foregone conclusion. If public coercion is the litmus test, it becomes very difficult to argue that official
inaction is itself a violation of reproductive rights.78 While it is
74. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1246-50 (N.J. 1988).
75. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see
also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 (1980) ("[Tihe liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause affords protection against unwarranted government interference with freedom of choice
76. As a result, the failure to recognize the hand of the state in "private" interactions has an
even more significant impact on women in the abortion context than in contract parenthood. For
example, despite the Supreme Court's occasional refusal to allow a state to put its power at the
disposal of a private individual (for instance by requiring spousal consent to abortions, e.g.,
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)), the Court has never evidenced any concern
about the effect of private exercises of power on women's reproductive autonomy absent state
involvement.
77. For discussion of the way in which my treatment of the governmental action/inaction dichotomy interfaces with the distinction between positive and negative liberty, see infra note 84.
78. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON. FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 93-102 (1987). MacKinnon argues
that, since Roe clearly identified the exercise of governmental power as the wrong from which
women were to be protected, it provides no conceptual framework for arguing that women have an
affirmative right to governmental assistance in attaining abortion. Id. Nor does it provide a basis
for claiming that nongovernmental influences on their ability to choose deprive them of their constitutional rights. Under Roe, if the state has simply stayed out of a woman's decision to terminate
her pregnancy (or not to terminate it), that decision is by definition free. The Rust plaintiffs, for
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surely correct that the liberal focus on choice is misguided and unlikely to produce beneficial results for women, it is important to
point out that the Supreme Court's conclusion in Rust was not inevitable. That is, there is no reason, as a matter of logic, why the
Court could not have concluded instead that the withholding of governmental aid in this context constituted unacceptable governmental
interference with women's fundamental rights.79
Thus, in the next section I will briefly articulate an argument that
the gag rules constitute affirmative governmental interference with
those rights. That argument will illustrate how the formal equality
position adopted by the Rust Court is subject to substantive equality
criticisms analogous to those I raised against Shalev. In the section
following, I will then suggest certain attitudes that may have prevented the Rust majority from adopting this line of argument, and
thus may account for the result it reached. Finally, I will contend
that the prevailing conceptualization of the funding issue (as a question of choice or coercion, private freedom or governmental interference), like Shalev's parallel conceptualization of contract
parenthood in choice terms, diverts attention away from those attitudes, thereby hindering the struggle for meaningful reproductive
autonomy. In short, the problem with the liberal privacy frame for
this issue is not that it necessarily produces the wrong results, but
rather that it obscures the real determinants of judicial holdings-attitudes towards women and reproduction.
example, were in the difficult position of having to argue that it is the government's failure to
provide women information about their reproductive options that unconstitutionally interferes with
their decisions. Because of such shortcomings, MacKinnon asserts that the due-process-based privacy argument for the abortion right is less useful than an equality-based argument that contends
policies limiting women's access to abortion constitute sex discrimination. Id. at 102 n.21.
79. In fact, the Court has similarly concluded in other contexts. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970) (withholding welfare benefits without full procedural protections unconstitutionally violates recipients' procedural due process rights); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963) (withholding unemployment benefits from Seventh Day Adventist who refused to work on
Saturdays violated her right to free exercise of religion, much as would a fine directly imposed
against her); cf. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (conditioning receipt
of county-funded medical care on residence requirement unconstitutionally burdens indigents'
right of interstate travel). But see Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 706 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (concluding that "government regulation that indirectly and incidentally calls for a choice
between securing a governmental benefit and adherence to religious beliefs is wholly different
from governmental action or legislation that criminalizes religiously inspired activity or inescapably compels conduct that some find objectionable for religious reasons").
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Abortion Law and Women's Autonomy

In a line of cases spanning nearly fifteen years, the Supreme

Court has upheld various limitations on the use of state or federal
money to finance abortion-related activities,8" repeatedly asserting
that the constraints faced by low-income women seeking abortions
are imposed by their poverty, not by the government."' Consistent
with this body of precedent, the Court held in Rust that the Title X
"gag" rules, prohibiting federally funded physicians from discussing
abortion with their patients, did not constitute governmental interference with low-income women's reproductive decision making.8 2
As Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority:
The Government has no affirmative duty to "commit any resources to facilitating abortions," . . . and its decision to fund childbirth but not abortion
"places no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to
terminate her pregnancy .... " Congress' refusal to fund abortion counseling and advocacy leaves a pregnant woman with the same choices as if the
government had chosen not to fund family-planning services at all.83

The Court's position here is analogous to Shalev's argument that
a woman's signing of a parenthood contract is not coerced as long as
it is only her economic circumstances that caused her to sign it.84
80. Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (use of clinics that receive public funds for abortion counseling and referral); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (use of
public employees or facilities for nontherapeutic abortions); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980) (federal support for medically necessary abortions); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977)
(federal support for nontherapeutic abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (federal support for nontherapeutic abortions for indigent women). The aspects of the Rust holding discussed
here are perfectly consistent with these precedents, and my critique of the line of analysis employed in that case is equally applicable to its predecessors.
81. See, e.g., Maher, 432 U.S. at 474 ("An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no
disadvantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund childbirth . . . . The state may
have made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing the woman's decision, but
it has imposed no restriction on access that was not already there. The indigency that may make it
difficult-and in some cases, perhaps, impossible-for some women to have abortions is neither
created nor in any way affected by the Connecticut regulation.").
82. Rust, Ill S. Ct. at 1776-78. The Court also held, in the principal part of the opinion, that
the "gag" rules did not violate the First Amendment rights of either the clinics that receive Title
X funds or their employees. Id. at 1771-76. While that aspect of the decision is very troubling,
and will arguably have far-ranging impact, it is not my concern here.
83. Id. at 1776-77 (quoting Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 511 (1989)
and McRae, 448 U.S. at 315 (emphasis added)). It is important to note that the Court did not
explicitly reject the idea that the woman who cannot afford an abortion is, in some sense, coerced
to become a mother. Rather, the Court merely considered such coercion to come from private
forces, in particular her poverty, and therefore to be beyond the scope of constitutional protection.
84. Both of these positions also resonate with the established distinction between positive liberty
(freedom to) and negative liberty (freedom from). See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1989). Just as only negative freedom is thought to
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Both are formal equality arguments in that both treat the private
interaction at issue-signing a parenthood contract or not obtaining
an abortion-as no different from other such interactions, and thus
as appropriately subject to market pressures. Moreover, both positions can be attacked from within the liberal framework. That is,
just as it is possible to use substantive equality concerns to argue
that parenthood contracts coerce women, so it is also possible to use
such concerns to argue that governmental failure to fund abortions
does so as well.85
The Court's conclusion is informed by a vision of the social setting in which conception occurs that is just as unrealistically individualistic as Shalev's vision of the social setting in which contract
parenthood occurs. Both ignore the crucial importance of the context in which individual choices and governmental "inaction" take
place. Thus, a woman's "consent" to a parenthood contract, against
a backdrop of patriarchal culture and limited economic alternatives,
is in many senses not at all free.86 Similarly, governmental failure to
fund abortion counseling and services,. against a backdrop of federal
funding of childbirth and extensive state structuring of the economic
life of low-income people, constitutes interference.
be protected by the Constitution, so only claims to protection from governmental intrusion in one's
reproductive activity, rather than claims to governmental assistance in engaging in such activity,
are thought to be legitimate.
In the argument that I am presenting here, I might appear to be suggesting that access to
abortion funding is a negative liberty. Such a proposition would, of course, fly directly in the face
of the traditional understanding of that term. My analysis is premised, however, not upon the
established distinction between positive and negative liberties, but rather upon a rejection of that
distinction as incoherent.
The right to private property and protection of contractual freedom are uncontroversial . . .; but they are fully positive. Their existence depends on the willingness of
state officials to enforce trespass laws and contractual arrangements.
These relatively uncontroversial rights are thus positive in character. The rejection
of a right to welfare or to freedom from private discrimination cannot rest on a claim
that all constitutional rights are "negative" in the sense that they do not require governmental involvement. The line between constitutionally protected rights and unprotected interests depends not on the distinction between negative and positive rights,
but on substantive ideas about what government normally or naturally does.
Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to Pornography,
Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1992) (footnotes omitted). This section, then,
should be read as implicitly raising questions about the viability of the negative/positive liberty
formulation.
85. For a powerful rendition (with many concrete examples) of the argument that governmental failure to interfere in the private sphere of the family can be seen instead as intervention, see
Fiances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 MICH. J. L. REFORM 835
(1985). See also Olsen, supra note 63.
86. See supra part III.A.2.
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The federal government subsidizes birth by providing Title X
funds for counseling and referral to prenatal care facilities, as well
as Medicaid payments for childbirth.87 The Rust majority held that
such a practice, combined with the lack of governmental support for
abortion, " 'places no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman
who chooses to terminate her pregnancy, but rather . . . encourages
alternative activity.' "88 Because the woman has the same range of
choice with or without government funding, the Court concluded,
subsidizing birth does not unduly burden that choice.8 9
This argument assumes that we are in fact dealing with two
rights here, a right to terminate a pregnancy and a right to continue
it. But clearly there is only one right-that of reproductive decision
making. The essence of Roe is its protection of a woman's freedom
to choose between termination and continuation. A woman has only
two options here: Her decision must inevitably be either to end the
pregnancy or to carry the fetus to term. Thus, by subsidizing only
one side of the decisional equation, the government has undeniably
skewed the outcome, making one option more appealing than the
other. As Justice Brennan noted in discussing governmental refusal
to fund therapeutic abortions, "[T]here is 'more' than a simple refusal to fund a protected activity in this case; instead, there is a
program that selectively funds but one of two choices of a constitutionally protected decision, thereby penalizing the election in the
disfavored option." 90 The point is equally applicable to Rust, where
the government selectively funds the provision of information about
only one of the two choices. 91
Through Title X and its regulations, the government has actively
interfered in the private sphere: It has established a family planning
program that makes it more difficult for a woman to decide to terminate a pregnancy than it would be if no such program existed at
all. Deciding to abort is more difficult because, without any family
planning program, a woman would necessarily have to spend some
of her own money to deal with her pregnancy, either to terminate it
or to bear a child. Since she would have to pay either way, her pov87. Rust, Ill S. Ct. at 1776, 1781 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 1776-77 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980)).
89. Id. at 1777.
90. McRae, 448 U.S. at 336 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91. The "gag" rules clearly have "both the purpose and the effect of manipulating [a woman's]
decision as to the continuance of her pregnancy." Rust, 11I S. Ct. at 1778 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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erty would not make it any harder for her to choose one option or
the other. Under the program established by the Maher-to-Rust line
of cases, however, it becomes more difficult for her to choose abortion because that is the only course of action that requires her to
spend her own limited funds. Thus it is precisely the existence of the
federal program that causes her poverty to burden her reproductive
choice. 92
The Title X regulations burden a woman's decision not only because they expressly support childbirth but also because they remove this one area of health care-abortion-from the otherwise
encompassing web of governmental subsidies. As Mark Tushnet has
stated in discussing Maher and McRae:
[Those decisions assume that] the basic rule is that goods are allocated by
market processes. If the government allocates some or many goods, relegating some particular good to the market isolates that good from the rest,
presumably because the government wishes to see less consumption of the
good. . . . And actions designed to discourage consumption place burdens
on the decision to consume in any reasonable understanding. In our society,
the government allocates most of the goods that poor people consume. Their
shelter is subsidized in public housing, their consumption of food is subsidized by food stamps, their use of most medical services is subsidized by
Medicaid, and they have few remaining resources to devote to purchases of
unsubsidized goods. Thus, they are in precisely the situation described,
where a decision not to subsidize constitutes a burden.s

This point is equally applicable to the "gag" rules, which similarly
burden low-income women by excluding abortion counseling and referral from the otherwise comprehensive obstetric and gynecological
services subsidized by the government under Title X. 94
92. See McRae, 448 U.S. at 333-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 942 (1991) (quoting Mark V. Tushnet,
The Supreme Court on Abortion, in ABORTION, MEDICINE AND THE LAW (J. Douglas Butler &
David F. Walbert eds., 1985)). Compare LAURENCE TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 243-44
(1985):
The Court's willingness to uphold laws whose apparent injustice is thought simply
to reflect the world's own cruelty . . . seems most vivid in a case like [McRae] ....

In [Roe], abortion was not perceived as involving the intensely public question of...
the subordination of the poor to the rich through the instrument of coerced childbirth

for those unable to afford medical procedures placed by the state on an ability-to-pay
basis.

[If the issue had been so stated], then even the state's use of selective funding to
encourage the birth of unwanted children might resemble a program to foster involuntary servitude more closely than an exercise of government's prerogative to set its own
priorities.
94. See Rust, I I I S. Ct. at 1781 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). My point is not that govern-
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Finally, one could argue that governmental interference in
women's abortion decisions is in fact unavoidable. Frances Olsen

has pointed out, in another context, that governmental refusal to
criminalize spouse abuse does not preserve the state's neutrality towards the family, because courts will still have to rule on whether
the past abuse should be a mitigating or excusing factor when the
victimized spouse kills the abuser. 5 Similarly, even if the government fails to fund abortion services, it must still decide how to treat
people's responses to that policy-as, for example, when a woman
steals the money to pay for an abortion and then raises the defense

of necessity.
In summary, then, it makes just as much sense to see a refusal to

subsidize abortion services and counseling for low-income women as
governmental interference in reproductive decision making-and the
births that result as instances of forced motherhood-as it does to
see nonfunding as noninterference. In fact, the Court's conclusory
equation of state inaction with noninterference reflects an abstract
and highly debatable conceptualization of coercion that is totally inattentive to the circumstances in which reproductive decisions are
made.96 Nevertheless, my point here is not that the Court's decisions
were illogical, but rather that they simply were not inevitable. The
ment must therefore subsidize all needs of low-income people; the decision about what to subsidize depends upon what we, as a society, think is important. But that question is not asked, much
less answered, when the focus is only on the question of whether some abstract concept of choice is
satisfied, separate and apart from the conditions in which reproductive activity occurred. See infra
part IV.E (discussing how focus on choice diverts attention from such questions).
t
95. Olsen, supra note 63, at 1509.
96. It is arguable, of course, that the interference position just presented-the argument that
governmental failure to fund abortion information and services interferes with women's reproductive freedom-reflects and reinforces negative images of women. Here, as in the contract
parenthood context, the suggestion that a woman should be protected from the pressures of the
marketplace could seem to imply that women are incapable of making their own decisions and
protecting their own interests in the competitive "public" sphere. Moreover, providing affirmative
governmental aid to pregnant, low-income women (like refusing to enforce their parenthood agreements) could generate resentment by others who are equally coerced into harmful decisions by
their lack of access to economic resources. In addition, asserting that reproductive activity is especially deserving of protection from marketplace pressures could, arguably, reinforce the idealized
image of motherhood that justified women's oppression for over a century.
Interestingly, I have seen little concern about these possible ill effects of the anti-Rust position
expressed by feminist writers. But cf Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV.
737, 777 (1989) (claiming that traditional arguments for the abortion right reinforce sexism by
treating reproduction as central to women's identity); Frances Olsen, Unraveling Compromise,
103 HARV. L. REV. 105, 112 n.32 (echoing Rubenfeld's concerns). Perhaps an understanding of
the amount of explicit sexual coercion in women's lives and an appreciation of the practical importance of the abortion option for women override the more theoretical concerns often expressed
about the symbolic messages that coercion-styled, special-treatment-type arguments convey.
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doctrinal discourse allows one to argue either that failure to fund
the exercise of a constitutional right is burdensome or that it is
not.97
Why then, has the Court repeatedly refused to find that failure to
fund in the reproductive realm burdens fundamental rights, despite
its (at least occasional) willingness to do so in other contexts? 98 In
the next section, I show how the conclusion that an abortion decision constitutes a choice, and the conclusion that the governmental
failure to subsidize it is noninterference, are based upon a belief in
the same patriarchal images of women that Shalev's analysis of contract parenthood unintentionally supports. I argue that it is only by
unearthing the hidden assumptions about women and reproductive
roles that inform decisions like Rust that we can come to understand what makes the jurists deciding those cases conclude that the
behaviors they are assessing are chosen rather than coerced.
D.

Abortion Law and Images of Women

To the extent that it treats the situation of low-income women
with unwanted pregnancies as freely chosen, the Rust line of cases
assumes that women deserve their pregnancies (and their poverty),
implying that these women's situations are somehow the result of
their own irresponsibility. 9 Thus, at the most obvious level, such
97. Note, by the way, that the suggestion here that the "gag" rules could be seen as imposing a
burden on women does not challenge the public/private dichotomy or the liberal belief in choice.
The substantive equality argument presented in this section merely changes the definition of what
constitutes governmental coercion; it does not question the coherence of the concept of coercion
itself.
98. See supra note 79.
99. The most blatant example of this attitude is reflected in Justice White's dissenting opinion
in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), where he' characterizes the Court's holding in Roe as
signifying that "the Constitution of the United States values the convenience, whim, or caprice of
the putative mother more than the life or potential life of the fetus." Id. at 221 (White, J., dissenting). But see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (sympathetically describing burdens
unwanted children can impose on women).
The "bad girl" image conjured up in Justice White's dissent is reiterated in public funding
cases. In cases such as Maher and Webster, for example, the government's decision to withhold
funding is characterized as a legitimate "value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion."
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490,
506 (1989) (citing Maher). By describing a refusal to financially support abortions as an acceptable "value judgment" in favor of childbirth, the Court implicitly raises questions about the morality of a woman whose "values" cause her to choose termination of her pregnancy over carrying
it to term.
Dorothy Roberts has argued that the disproportionate number of criminal prosecutions of
women of color for using drugs or alcohol during pregnancy constitutes punishment of those
women for having carried their pregnancies to term. Roberts, supra note 32, at 1445-50. However,
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cases rely upon and perpetuate negative stereotypes of women, or
perhaps just of low-income -women, as immature, unreliable, and
overemotional individuals to whom important moral decisions about
life and death should not be delegated. But more subtle messages
are presented by these cases as well.
For instance, it is interesting to note how differently women who
are thinking of aborting their fetuses and women who are thinking
of putting their children up for adoption are treated. 100 In both situations the woman is faced with an unwanted pregnancy. In either
situation, her lack of money might cause her to do something she
does not want to do-give up the baby or carry the pregnancy to
term (and keep the child). Yet in the adoption situation the law
takes great pains to protect her from being coerced by her circumstances into making a decision she will later regret. In virtually all
states, adoptions are closely regulated to prevent private "sales,"
and many states also protect women with required waiting periods
during which they cannot consent to termination of their parental
rights. 1 1 In contrast, Rust and its predecessors reveal that neither
Congress nor the Supreme Court sees any need to insulate a woman's decision about whether to continue a pregnancy from market
pressures.
Why is the law so willing to conceive that a woman might be
coerced by indigency into giving up a child but not that a woman
might be coerced by indigency into bearing one? It is hard to escape
the conclusion that the coerced loss of a child through adoption is
considered a harm to women, but forced motherhood is not."0 2 Once
again, the good girl and the bad girl emerge. The fact that the law
treats relinquishing one's child for adoption as an injury both reflects and reinforces the notion that being a woman means being
when considered in combination with state refusal to fund abortions for low-income women of
color, such prosecutions suggest to me that what is really being punished is the initial act of
conception rather than the failure to abort.
100. Many people argue, of course, that contract parenthood situations should be treated as
analogous to adoption. See, e.g.. FIELD. supra note 49, at 84-89.
101. See id. at 84-85, 90. "in an adoption situation, no state in this country binds a mother to
give up her child because of a consent to adoption or a contract with prospective adoptive parents
that was executed before the child was born." Id. at 84.
102. Of course, a woman could be coerced by indigency into aborting, too, in order to avoid the
expense of raising another child. That constraint on her free choice is not good either, but it is a
lot harder to eliminate than coerced child bearing. The only way to do so would be to pay for all
costs of childrearing as well, and that would probably be prohibitively expensive, or at least politically unlikely. Thus, if the government pays for both birth and abortion, and childeare perhaps, it
arguably does the best it can to make things even.
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someone who would love to be a parent and is devoted to her offspring.' °3 "Good" girls love their children and thus suffer a harm if
they lose them. On the other hand, the fact that the law does not
treat bearing an unwanted child as an injury reflects and reinforces
the flip side of that message: If all "good" girls love children, then
forcing a woman to have a child cannot possibly do her harm.1" 4 Or,
to put it less charitably, a woman who would stray so far from the
societal role of devoted mother as to actually perceive having a child
as a harm to herself must be "bad," and therefore is undeserving of
state protection. Thus, the existing legal rules protect the woman
who conforms to pronatalist gender expectations and punish the one
who does not.

To the extent that this pronatalist slant stems from the notion
that women are instinctively maternal, abortion doctrine confirms
Shalev's point that biological definitions of kinship are harmful to
women. After all, it certainly seems plausible that the Court would
be more likely to see coerced motherhood as a harm if women were
not thought of as natural mothers. The fact that Shalev's insights
about images of women are vindicated here is not surprising, of
course, since the strength of her approach is its focus on ideological
reform. The inherent weakness in her argument is also apparent,
however, for by accepting the public/private dichotomy and using
choice as the determinant of results, Shalev legitimates the Court's
use of the interference/noninterference formula, and thus both facilitates and obscures the operation of the very attitudes she deplores.
103. Of course, one might expect this notion of children's importance to their mothers to generate the rule that adoption should be banned altogether. However, a corollary to the idea of the
loving mother-the idea of the self-sacrificing mother-is deployed to justify adoption when the
woman is single and/or has very limited resources, on the grounds that she can thereby provide
the child a better life.
Thus, in practice the law often treats certain mothers who are putting their children up for
adoption as "bad" girls. As Shalev points out, unmarried mothers (especially low-income ones) are
not given special status and are often pressured to give up their children for the latter's own good.
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
104. I do not mean that a woman who is coerced to bear a child will receive no satisfaction
from or will not love the child. I mean that life will be difficult for her and the child because of
whatever barriers made her not want to carry the child to term in the first place, such as lack of
money or the existence of other children.
Resistance to the idea that being forced to have a child could be a harm is evident not only in
the abortion context but also in the unreceptive reaction many courts have had to so-called wrongful pregnancy claims. See, e.g., Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568 (Ark. 1982) (holding that parents could not sue doctor who negligently performed vasectomy for costs of raising their normal
child).
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Public Power and Reproductive "Choice"

Given the indeterminacy of the distinctions between choice and
coercion, noninterference and interference, the Court's attitudes towards women provide a better explanation for its rulings in this
area. But the public/private dichotomy. that grounds abortion doctrine hides these negative attitudes, focusing attention and argumentation on whether women's reproductive decisions are burdened by
governmental action.1" 5 Like Shalev's focus on choice in the contract
parenthood context, the traditional formulation of the abortion
funding issue diverts attention from fundamental questions about
how to structure our reproductive lives and who should bear the
burden of reproducing the citizenry. Moreover, it serves an apologetic function here as it does in the surrogacy arena, legitimating a
world vision that obscures the operation of state power in the realm
of supposedly "private" conduct.
Privacy doctrine assumes that there is a separate and discrete
realm of reproductive decision making that is untouched by governmental power. While the two sides of the debate might disagree as
to where the line between "private" choice and public coercion
should be drawn, both agree that it is that line which marks the
difference between legitimate and illegitimate governmental policies.
In conceptualizing the problem in this way, however, both positions
ignore the extent to which the "private" conditions in which the
government is not supposed to interfere are themselves produced by
the state. Just as Shalev fails to recognize that governmental policies contribute, at both an ideological and a material level, to
women's decisions to become "surrogate" mothers, so the Rust court
fails to recognize that the public hand is present in the very pregnancy that makes a woman's reproductive decision necessary.' 06
What causes unwanted pregnancies? The Supreme Court, and
105. The prevailing abortion discourse has a constraining effect even on the dissenting opinions
in the funding cases, most of which-perhaps for strategic reasons-also limit their arguments to
the choice/coercion framework. For an eloquent articulation of the coercion argument that nevertheless accepts as a given that the appropriate question is whether the government intervened
(rather than, for example, how it should intervene), see Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 329-30
(1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
106. Government activity significantly affects the distribution of resources in society as well.
Thus, low-income women's poverty could also be said to be a product of state action. Nevertheless,
given the Supreme Court's resistance to treating poverty as an ascribed, rather than an earned,
status for purposes of constitutional analysis, see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 27-29 (1973), I will not directly address that argument here.
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many citizens, believe they are primarily the product of a conscious
and irresponsible choice on the part of a woman to engage in unprotected sex-to "take the risk" of getting pregnant.' ° Indeed, the
fact that currently proposed abortion prohibitions frequently contain
exceptions for rape and incest,"0 8 as did many pre-Roe statutes, reinforces the notion that all pregnancies that do not fall within those
exceptions are freely willed, even if later regretted. 09 This is analogous to the apologetic effect of Shalev's analysis noted above. That
is, just as focusing on coercion in the surrogacy context implicitly
legitimates all contracts that are not invalidated as coercive," 0 so
focusing on coercion in the abortion context implicitly legitimates
all pregnancies that do not fit whatever the "coercion" categories
are. Such a focus thus conveys the notion that most sex in our society is consensual and that most pregnancies are the result of conscious risk-taking. It thereby hides the aspects of sexual interactions
and contraceptive practices that many would characterize as neither
consensual nor irresponsible, respectively.
Such images severely misunderstand and misrepresent the social
etiology of unwanted pregnancies, and completely ignore the state's
contribution to this social problem."' In the same way that a tortious act is said to cause the injury that follows as long as that injury was a foreseeable result of the act, so many pregnancies (and
abortions) that occur in this society are caused by the government,
in the sense that they are the foreseeable result of its policies." 2
At the most obvious level, the state affects the number of unwanted pregnancies by allowing sexual assaults to persist in the private sphere in alarming numbers. Thousands of women are raped
107. See supra note 99 (discussing examples of this attitude); see also William F. Buckley, Is
Abortion an Act of Responsibility? (copy on file with the DePaul Law Review).
108. See, e.g., LA, REV. STAT. ANN, § 14:87 (West Supp. 1992).,
109. While incest exceptions are perhaps partly aimed at preventing congenital abnormalities
thought to be produced by inbreeding, recent awareness of the extent to which children are sexually abused by relatives would suggest that such exceptions speak as much to child protection as to
species preservation.
110. See Robert W. Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 195, 203-04 (1987).
11I. I call unwanted pregnancies a problem because I assume that most women would probably
prefer not to get pregnant at all rather than to get pregnant and then undergo an abortion. There
are, of course, a variety of ways to solve such a problem. One way is to eliminate the reasons why
women do not want to have a child. Those reasons include financial constraints, lack of childcare,
and the social stigma attached to unmarried mothers. Other ways to solve the unwanted pregnancy problem include improving contraception and protecting women from coercive sex.
112. 1 am indebted to Gary Peller for this point.
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each year; only a fraction of those attacks are ever reported.113
While it is obviously private actors who actually perpetrate these
attacks, the ignominious history of judicial unreceptivity to rape
claims,1"4 as well as the explicit doctrinal barriers placed in the way
of rape prosecutions, 1 ' at a minimum provide a sense of impunity to
those attackers and at worst actually legitimate their conduct.116
Moreover, some such assaults-rapes by husbands in states that retain the marital rape exclusion-are expressly authorized by the
state.1 17 Like rape, incest and child sexual abuse are also severely
underreported and difficult to prosecute. As a result, official statistics on these various types of sexual assault do not begin to capture
the actual prevalence of such attacks, nor do they provide any real18
istic means of estimating how many of them result in pregnancies.
Moreover, governmental programs and policies are implicated in
low-income women's unwanted pregnancies even aside from any
question of state-allowed attacks. It is not uncommon for public
family planning clinics to be insensitive to the health concerns and
comfort of their low-income patients. For example, these clinics consistently prescribe oral contraceptives, which pose more serious
health risks and are often accompanied by uncomfortable side effects, rather than safer methods of contraception such as the dia113.

In 1990 alone, 102,555 rapes were reported to the authorities, FEDERAL BUREAU OF IN15 (1990), probably less than a quarter of those that
actually occurred. See also SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 10 (1987).
114. See generally ESTRICH, supra note 113.
115. See generally id.
116. See DIANA SCULLY, UNDERSTANDING SEXUAL VIOLENCE 110-1l1, 159 (1990) (study of
convicted rapists reporting that overwhelming majority thought they would never be punished for
their act, and that they often thought it was a trivial transgression). Moreover, as MacKinnon
points out, the discourse of rape trials-in which any behavior not typical of "good girls" makes a
rape victim's testimony immediately suspect-might even discourage women from using contraception, since, for example, evidence that a woman had her diaphragm in when attacked might
actually be used to undermine her testimony that she had not consented to sex. MACKINNON.
supra note 78, at 95.
117. See Note, To Have and To Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth
Amendment. 99 HARV. L. REV. 1254, 1258-62 (1986); see also ESTRICH. supra note 101, at 72-79
(discussing the marital rape exemption).
118. Thus, the frequently-made "pro-life [argument] that cases of pregnancy caused by rape
are so rare as to be irrelevant," KRISTEN LUKER. ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD
234 (1984), is much less convincing when unreported rapes are considered. And even as to reported attacks, the data do not fairly indicate the incidence of pregnancy due to rape because
women who report sexual assaults are often given prophylactic treatment to prevent pregnancy,
such as the "morning-after" pill or a vacuum curettage of the uterus. Id. at 235. Thus, the notion
that eliminating the abortion right would affect few rape victims ignores the fact that many such
women currently receive abortions as "treatment" for rape and therefore do not get counted in the
numbers of those who need abortions for this reason.
VESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES
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phragm." 9 They also frequently fail to fully explain a woman's options to her, leading many women to believe that their only safe

choice is to use the method recommended or nothing at all. As a
result, a significant proportion of women who engage in unprotected
sex may be doing so because, due to inadequate and incorrect information about contraception, they know of no other way to protect
themselves from health risks and/or significant discomfort. 2 0 In addition, inadequate sex education programs in public schools prevent
teenagers from being fully informed about birth control methods,
resulting in many ineffective efforts at contraception.
State power affects sexual relations in much more subtle ways as
well, suggesting yet another set of reasons why it is unproductive to
ask whether or not government interferes with women's abortion decisions. For example, economic dependence, produced in part by unequal pay scales unaddressed by comparable worth law... and by
inadequate maintenance awards given at the dissolution of mar-

riages,"' can cause a woman to accede to-her partner's sexual demands because she sees such compliance as a necessary quid for the
quo of financial support. In addition, judicial unreceptiveness to
119. See, e.g., ALEXANDRA D. TODD, INTIMATE ADVERSARIES 63-64 (1989). Doctors often do
this because they believe that their low-income patients will not be able to understand, or will not
be willing to comply with, the more detailed procedures required for methods like the diaphragm.
However, such beliefs often stem from unexamined negative stereotypes based on race, class, and
sex rather than on accurate perceptions of individual patients. Thus, in her study Todd found that
the darker a woman's skin and/or the lower her place on the economic scale, the
poorer the care and efforts at explanation she received. Women of color and/or an
economically poor background were more apt to be seen as "difficult" patients when
they asked questions, were more likely to be urged to use birth control pills or the
IUD rather than the diaphragm in the clinic, and in the private practitioner's office,
where nearly all women received the pill, they were more likely to be talked down to,
scolded, and patronized.
Id. at 77.
120. And for many people, of course, there simply is no safe and effective form of contraception
available. On the inadequacy of available contraceptives, see generally ROSALIND PETCHESKY,
ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE 189-90 (1990).

121. E.g., American Fed'n of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Washington, 770 F.2d
1401, 1405-06 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that state's decision to reject comparable worth theory in
setting wages for class of employees, 70% of whom were women, did not give rise to liability
under Title VII disparate impact or disparate treatment theories). See generally Mary E. Becker,
Barriers Facing Women in the Wage-Labor Market and the Need for Additional Remedies: A
Reply to Fischel and Lazear, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 934 (1986).
122. See generally LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 146 (1985); see
also Jane Rutherford & Barbara Tishler, Equalizing the Cost of Divorce Under the Uniform
Marriage Dissolution Act: Maintenance Awards in Illinois, 23 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. (forthcoming
1992) (comparing per capita income of spouses after divorce).
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rape cases has helped to create the current climate in which a concern with not appearing sexually available--whether because such

availability is not considered appropriate for women or because it
can be used later to support allegations that an individual consented-can prevent a woman from using a contraceptive at all. 23
Moreover, governmental policies not only prevent women from
avoiding pregnancy, but also prevent them from carrying a pregnancy to term once a child is conceived. In a society where governmentally subsidized childcare is virtually nonexistent and parental
12 4
leave policies are among the worst in the industrialized world;
where advancement in many jobs is predicated upon such total
"dedication" to the employer as to preclude any meaningful role as
a parent; 12 5 in which women as a group earn 68.6 cents for every
dollar earned by men;"" and where the major financial, social, and
emotional burdens of parenthood still fall, and are thought properly
to fall, on women,' 2 7 it is not surprising that having a child is not a

viable economic option for many women who would otherwise like
to have one. These economic realities are not merely the product of
private action in the "private" sphere, but are directly related to
existing governmental policies. Judicial and legislative resistance to

meaningful pay equity reform buttresses existing wage inequalities;
123. See supra note 116.
This is not to say, however, that in an ideal world of enlightened governmental action to protect
women and increase reproductive and employment options, the abortion right would no longer be
necessary. Rather, in such a world the rhetoric of self-actualization and autonomy currently used
to support reproductive rights arguments would be much more meaningful. My point here, then, is
merely that the abstract right to choose is not necessarily sufficient, if exercised in a world of
limited options.
124. Alyson Pytte, House Passes Parental Leave; White House Promises Veto, 48 CONG. Q.
WKLY.REP. 1471, 1471 (1990). See generally, Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: Restructuring
the Workplace. 32 ARIz. L. REV. 431 (1990); Nadine Taub, From ParentalLeaves to Nurturing
Leaves, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SoC. CHANGE 381 (1984-85). But see Maria O'Briei Hylton, "Parental Leaves and Poor Women: Paying the Pricefor Time Off, 52 U. PITT. L. REv. 475 (1991)
(offering an economic argument against parental leave legislation on grounds that such legislation'
will harm poor women).
125. See generally Dowd, supra note 124 (advocating a restructuring of the workplace to resolve conflicts between work and family responsibilities); Deborah L. Rhode, The "No-Problem"
Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cultural Change, 100 YALE LJ. 1731, 1763-68 (1991)
("Many women with substantial caretaking obligations have little choice but to drop out of the
most demanding positions.").
126. Helaine Olen, Wage Equity Concept Wanes as Women Slowly Close Pay Gap. L.A.
TIMES. Aug. 28, 1991, at A5 (quoting U.S. Census Bureau statistics); see also Rhode, supra note
125, at 1764 (estimating that full-time female workers earn 65 % of the annual salary of full-time
male workers).
127. Rhode, supra note 125, at 1748-49.
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governmental failure to apply maximum hour legislation to many
workplaces allows and legitimates inhumanely long work weeks; 128
the absence of state-subsidized childcare and medical care-or governmental regulations requiring employers to provide certain basic
necessities for workers, such as childcare, health insurance, and nurturing leave-is what makes child rearing prohibitively expensive
for many.' 29
Thus the interference/noninterference debate in the abortion context, like the coercion/choice debate in the contract parenthood context, relies upon the inaccurate assumption that at least some reproductive behavior occurs in a realm of pure choice, unaffected by
governmental power. It both assumes and perpetuates the legitimacy
of the public/private distinction, thereby deflecting attention from
the question of how, rather than whether, government should affect
reproductive practices. In so doing, it obscures both the attitudinal
explanations for judicial conclusions and the structural constraints
on all women's exercises of choice.
V.

CONCLUSION

In summary, just as Shalev's endorsement of contract parenthood
reinforces, rather than undermines, the biological definition of kin128. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1988 & Supp. 1 1989) (requiring employers to pay time-andone-half to employees who work more than 40 hours per week); 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(l)(A)(ii)
(1988 & Supp. 1 1989) (exempting small businesses from the maximum hour provisions of §
207(a)); 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(21) (1988 & Supp. 1 1989) (exempting domestic-service employees
from the maximum hour provisions of § 207(a)).
129. I realize that some might react to this paragraph by saying that I am merely describing
governmental failures to act, and that the problems I recount here are the product of private, not
governmental, power. Nevertheless, each of the failures to act that I mention occurs in an area
that is already characterized by extensive governmental involvement in the "private" sphere-in
either the workplace (maximum hour and minimum wage regulation, discrimination prohibitions,
occupational safety and health requirements) or the low-income family (AFDC, food stamps,
Medicaid). It seems clear to me that the gaps in the regulatory system structure and control the
private sphere as much as the affirmative rules in it do. The fact that government allows employers to verbally harass their employees, see Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance,
and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1, I (1988), has
just as much impact on those employees as the fact that the government affirmatively bars employers from imposing serious health risks on workers. The regulatory apparatus is so pervasive
that what it allows is as significant as what it prohibits.
Moreover, as the Realists pointed out long ago, the arm of government is present in all "private" economic transactions; for example, government-established private property rules necessarily constrain contractual choice by affecting the relative bargaining power of the parties. See,
e.g., Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. ScI. Q.
470 (1923); cf. Olsen, supra note 85 (arguing that the state is implicated in "private" family
relations).
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ship (or at least paternity), so the body of abortion law created by
the Supreme Court in the abortion funding cases both relies upon
and reproduces the harmful notion that motherhood is an unadulterated benefit to women (and society). Furthermore,just as Shalev's
focus on whether women freely sign parenthood contracts obscures
underlying questions about why infertility is a "problem" and
whether reproduction should be commodified, so the Rust majority's
focus on whether the Title X "gag" rules constitute state interference with reproductive rights diverts attention from the underlying
question of what we mean by those rights, of why women experience
unwanted pregnancies, and of how we should structure sexual and
reproductive relations in this society.
Whether one argues that a woman's decisions are freely chosen or
coerced, a focus on choice diverts attention from the fundamental
questions of substantive justice that should inform social policy.
Here, as in the surrogacy context, the focus should not be on
whether something or someone actively interfered with women's
choices, but rather on what conditions characterize the society in
which reproductive activities are carried out. Legal rules about
abortion are most likely to produce humane and fulfilling reproductive relations if they result from a focus on how and why women
experience unwanted pregnancies, not on whether they "freely
chose" them. No one relishes the idea of an abortion. It is a necessary, but not a preferred, option. 1 0 Protecting women from coerced
sex, developing safe and effective contraceptive techniques (as well
as providing men and women with the information they need to use
them correctly), undermining harmful sex role stereotypes, and restructuring the workplace to accommodate the reproductive and
child-rearing activities of both sexes would go far-and certainly
much farther than the post hoc, punitive approach legalized by Rust
and its predecessors-towards reducing the number of unwanted
pregnancies and producing meaningful reproductive lives for all
130. I do not mean to imply, however, that abortion should be seen as an entirely and inevitably negative event in a woman's life. Women experience abortion in a wide variety of ways, and
their reactions to it are closely related both to the particular life circumstances in which they find
themselves and to the social climate in which the abortion occurs. See PETCHESKY. s'upra note
120, at 155-61 (pointing out that access to abortion has enabled women to gain that control over
their reproductive activity that was a crucial prerequisite to career expansion and economic emancipation); ROTHMAN. supra note 27, at 106-07 (describing different ways that women experience
abortion); Olsen, supra note 96, at 123-24 n.78 (arguing that the notion of fetus as "living" being
is socially constructed belief, not biological fact).
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women.
Making choices is clearly emancipatory. Feeling that one has
some control over one's life is certainly essential to human dignity.
Unfortunately, however, liberal legal thought's preoccupation with
choice fails to recognize that choice is always and inevitably socially
constructed. All cultures are inherently coercive; they necessarily
define reality and constrain choices-although their definitions of
coercion may vary widely. It is unproductive, therefore, to use
choice as a benchmark of societal success.
Moreover, a choice-based framework is affirmatively harmful as
well. Thus, liberal legal thought's elaborately developed theory
about the proper relationship of the state to the individual obscures
and legitimates, rather than illuminates and attacks, the negative
images of women that influence judicial decisions in this area. Given
this, it is not surprising that Shalev's approach to contract
parenthood, while clearly motivated to help women, nevertheless
could have the ultimate (and ironic) effect of legitimating cases like
Rust. In retaining the liberal framework for discussion, she fails to
challenge the interlocking web of dichotomies that both prompted
and allowed the Court to render that decision: dichotomies between
choice and coercion, public and private, good girls and bad.

